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STATE V. THURSTON: AN EXAMINATION OF
ASSAULT, SELF-DEFENSE, AND TRESPASS IN
RELATION TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Megan E. Magoon*
I. INTRODUCTION
Darrell Thurston and Suzanne Harmon were romantically involved on an
intermittent basis for five years and had one child together.1 As a result of an
altercation that took place at Harmon’s home in Sullivan, Maine, on September 27,
2007, between Thurston and Harmon,2 Thurston was charged with assault,3
criminal mischief,4 and obstructing report of crime or injury.5 The testimony
during the trial illuminated the major factual differences between Thurston’s and
Harmon’s accounts of the night the incident took place.6 Thurston requested a selfdefense7 jury instruction based on his version of what had happened, which the trial
court ultimately denied.8 Following the jury trial, Thurston was found guilty of
assault and criminal mischief.9 Thurston appealed the decision to the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, and argued that in regard to the
assault charge, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to warrant a selfdefense jury instruction and that the trial court erred by failing to provide the
instruction.10
In State v. Thurston11 the Law Court held that the evidence presented at trial
did in fact generate a self-defense instruction, and because the trial court refused to
give the instruction, the Law Court vacated Thurston’s assault conviction.12 Justice
Gorman, on behalf of the majority, reasoned that the evidence, when viewed in a

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law. The Author would like to thank her
parents for their unconditional support, and Professor Deirdre Smith for her invaluable guidance.
1. State v. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 2, 969 A.2d 906, 908.
2. Id.
3. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 207(1)(A) (2006).
4. Id. at § 806(1)(A) (2006).
5. Id. at § 758(1)(A) (2006).
6. Trial Proceedings, State v. Thurston, No. CR-07-277 (Me. Super. Ct.,
Han. Cty., Mar. 11, 2008).
7. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2008-2009). The statute reads:
A person is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly force upon another person
in order to defend the person or a 3rd person from what the person reasonably believes to
be the imminent use of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person, and the person
may use a degree of such force that the person reasonably believes to be necessary for
such purpose.
Id.
8. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 5, 969 A.2d at 908.
9. Id. ¶ 1, 969 A.2d at 907.
10. Id. ¶ 7, 969 A.2d at 909.
11. 2009 ME 41, 969 A.2d 906.
12. Id. ¶ 1, 969 A.2d at 907-08.
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light most favorable to the defendant,13 warranted a self-defense instruction.14 The
majority took a detailed look at the “he said, she said” stories proffered by
Thurston and Harmon.15 Ultimately, the majority decided that because the
complaint did not specify which of Thurston’s actions constituted the assault, the
jury was free to accept his recitation of the facts and, in doing so, could reasonably
come to the conclusion that he only grabbed Harmon once—after she picked up a
knife and threatened him.16 The majority also directly countered the dissent’s
interpretation of Maine’s criminal trespass statute,17 and contended that based on
the facts,18 Thurston was licensed and privileged to be in the home,19 and therefore
any actions by Thurston—lawful or unlawful—did not automatically justify
Harmon’s use of force.20
Justice Alexander, writing for the dissent, interpreted the evidence differently.
Unlike the majority, the dissent focused on the fact that Harmon did not invite
Thurston into her home—in fact, she explicitly told him not to come to her home
on the night in question.21 Justice Alexander reasoned that because Thurston had
no right to be in the home, Harmon was justified in using force to eject him, and
any actions she took to remove Thurston were lawful.22 As such, the dissent held
that a self-defense instruction, which is only available to individuals acting in
defense of unlawful force, was not warranted for Thurston, and therefore would
have affirmed Thurston’s assault conviction.23
The Thurston decision turned on the court’s evaluation of two main factors—
the testimony of Thurston and Harmon regarding their relationship, and, in turn,
13. See State v. Glassman, 2001 ME 91, ¶ 12, 772 A.2d 863, 866. In that case, involving the
availability of a self-defense instruction, the court held that “[i]n evaluating whether a defense is
generated, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.” Id.
14. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 1, 969 A.2d at 907-08.
15. Id. ¶¶ 2-4, 969 A.2d at 908. Harmon testified that when Thurston arrived at her home, the
couple began to argue, and Thurston threw the meatballs she was cooking into the trash. Harmon said
that Thurston then threw her on the ground, kicked and punched her in the head, broke her cell phone,
and then picked up a knife. She said that at that point she also picked up a knife, presumably to protect
herself.
Thurston testified that Harmon grabbed a knife after he threw the meatballs in the trash and
smashed her cell phone. He said that once she put the knife down, he grabbed her shoulders to stop her
from picking it up again and that is the only time that he touched Harmon. Id.
16. Id. ¶ 12, 969 A.2d at 910.
17. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 402(1)(A), (D) (2006). The statute provides, in relevant part,
“[a] person is guilty of criminal trespass if, knowing that that person is not licensed or privileged to do
so, that person: A. Enters any dwelling place; . . . [or] D. Remains in any place in defiance of a lawful
order to leave . . . .” Id.
18. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 14, 969 A.2d at 910. The majority highlighted the fact that Harmon
and Thurston “had been involved in an ‘on again off again’ relationship for approximately five years,
and that they had been living together . . . for more than a month at the time of these events.” Id.
19. Id. ¶ 15, 969 A.2d at 910.
20. Id.
21. Id. ¶ 20, 969 A.2d at 911.
22. Id. ¶ 21, 969 A.2d at 911-12. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 104(1) (2006 & Supp.
2008-2009). The statute provides, in relevant part, “[a] person in possession or control of premises or a
person who is licensed or privileged to be thereon is justified in using nondeadly force upon another
person when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or terminate
the commission of a criminal trespass . . . .” Id.
23. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶¶ 21 & 26, 969 A.2d at 911-12.
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whether or not Thurston was licensed and privileged to enter Harmon’s home that
night.
This Note begins by exploring the development of the self-defense jury
instruction in Maine, and also examines the history of what it means to be “licensed
and privileged” in relation to Maine’s criminal trespass statute. In Part III, this
Note summarizes the Thurston decision and touches on the important factual issues
that were before the court. Next, in Part IV, this Note analyzes the court’s factual
and legal interpretation of the lower court’s decision that ultimately allowed or
precluded a self-defense instruction.
After examining the majority and dissenting opinions, this Note concludes that
the dissenting opinion offers the more appropriate analysis in this case. While the
majority opinion does provide an opinion which is founded on Maine case law, the
analysis surrounding the issue of trespass as it relates to individuals in domestic
relationships creates a broad and ambiguous standard for determining whether
someone is licensed and privileged to be in their partner’s home. The majority
reasoned that Thurston was licensed and privileged to be in Harmon’s home after
living with her for only a short period of time. The majority failed to draw a clear
line regarding the types of factors (verbal cues, specific living arrangements, or
expense sharing, etc.) that they felt would be sufficient to give an individual license
and privilege to enter a domestic partner’s home. The dissenting opinion, however,
placed more emphasis on the initial factual inquiry—whether Thurston was
lawfully in the home. It appears that the dissent was uncomfortable allowing
Thurston to garner a licensed and privileged status when he had not been living in
Harmon’s home for longer than one month, and Harmon had asked him not to
come to her home that evening. The dissent’s opinion maintained a higher standard
of the facts that must be in place to give someone license and privilege to be in a
domestic partner’s home. While Maine law is far from settled regarding the
“licensed and privileged” status in domestic relationships, the dissenting opinion
provides a more cautious and logical approach to interpreting precarious domestic
altercations.24
II. THE HISTORY OF SELF-DEFENSE IN MAINE
The law of self-defense is a centuries-old concept based on the notion that one
should not be punished criminally for actions that are not “morally blameworthy.”25
The Maine self-defense statute26 was enacted in its familiar form during the 1975
overhaul of Maine’s Criminal Code.27 There was much legislative debate about the
24. See generally Maine Coalition to End Domestic Violence, Statistics & Facts,
http://www.mcedv.org/news/statistics.htm (last visited January 25, 2010) (providing statistics regarding
the prevalence of domestic violence in Maine).
25. Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Elizabeth Cateforis, Self-Defense: What's a Jury Got To Do with It?,
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (2009). This conclusion was based on the notion that “the natural law
gave a person the right to protect himself from harm, if a person acted in self-defense and not with a
guilty mind . . . .” Id.
26. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108 (2006 & Supp. 2008-2009).
27. Id. In the 1975 Comment, the Legislature outlined that the purpose of the amendment was “to
clarify and articulate the law relating to self-defense and to the circumstances in which force may be
used against another . . . .” Id. comment (1975).
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specific wording of the statute, but the final legislation ultimately mirrored the
traditionally accepted theory of self-defense.28 The new code provision dealing
with self-defense required specific prerequisites that were to be met before the
defense could be utilized.29 The limitations on the defense included maintaining a
reasonable belief that the circumstances warranted the use of force, and further, that
the use of force was necessary in order to prevent bodily harm.30 The intention of
the legislature was that force was only to be used when it was the “only viable
remedy under the circumstances.”31
A complete understanding of the historical background of the self-defense
statute and the attendant implications requires an investigation into the legal
concept that serves as the backbone of the self-defense instruction. Historically, it
has been the opinion of the Law Court that to secure a self-defense instruction, one
must first establish the sufficiency of the evidence presented.32 Once the
sufficiency is established, regardless of the underlying unreasonableness, an
instruction must be given to avoid obvious error.33 The court also implemented a
burden shift upon the showing of sufficiency—the court reasoned that when the
defendant proffers evidence of self-defense, the burden lies with the prosecution to
disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.34
The Law Court has consistently held that if there is no contradictory evidence
that the victim of the alleged assault was using unlawful force on the defendant,
then a self-defense instruction is not warranted.35 The court further narrowed its
reasoning regarding self-defense instructions when it pointed out that there is no
duty for the court to “suspend its disbelief” or believe either party’s story
unconditionally.36 If the fact-finder does not feel that the facts warrant an action in
28. Legis. Rec. 787 (1976). Even with the extensive debate, the legislature made it clear that one of
the main purposes of the statute was to allow individuals in their own homes to use lawful force to eject
a trespasser. Id.
29. Id. at 788.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See State v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335, 338 (Me. 1985) (concluding that “[a] defendant is entitled
to a jury instruction on a particular defense when he ‘can point to the existence of . . . evidence
sufficient to make the existence of all the facts constituting the defense a reasonable hypothesis for the
fact-finder to entertain’”) (internal citations omitted); State v. Carmichael, 405 A.2d 732, 736 (Me.
1979) (stating that “[t]he theory of the defense must be submitted to the jury, provided it has support in
the evidence”); State v. Benson, 155 Me. 115, 123, 151 A.2d 266, 270 (1959) (reasoning that in order
for a self-defense instruction to be given, “the evidence should be sufficient fairly to raise the question
involved therein”).
33. State v. Davis, 528 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Me. 1987). See also State v. Sullivan, 1997 ME 71, ¶ 8,
695 A.2d 115, 118 (holding that a self-defense instruction was warranted even though the evidence in
favor of the defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense could certainly be seen as “objectively
unreasonable”).
34. State v. McKenzie, 605 A.2d 72, 74 (Me. 1992) (holding that defendant failed to generate
evidence showing that actions were taken in self-defense).
35. See, e.g., State v. Forbes, 2003 ME 106, ¶ 15, 830 A.2d 417, 421; State v. Winchenbach, 658
A.2d 1083, 1085 (Me. 1995).
36. Forbes, 2003 ME 106, ¶ 13, 830 A.2d at 420-21. The court noted that “[t]he issue of selfdefense is generated when ‘the evidence is sufficient to make the existence of all the facts constituting
the defense a reasonable hypothesis for the factfinder to entertain.’” Id. ¶ 14, 830 A.2d at 421 (quoting
State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 16, 724 A.2d 1222, 1229) (internal citations omitted).
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self-defense, then the self-defense instruction may be declined.37
While the Law Court has repeatedly examined the sufficiency standard for
self-defense and has examined the circumstances under which the instruction
should be given to the jury, it has a much more limited history regarding the
interplay of self-defense instructions and one of the main aspects of this case—
domestic trespass. In the case of State v. Benson, the court took a strong definitive
stance on the issue of trespass and what it meant to be on someone’s land
unlawfully.38 The court held that the failure to give a self-defense instruction was
not in error, as the jury could reasonably have believed that the defendants forced
their way into the home, and after being asked to leave, the defendants became the
initial aggressors and used unwarranted force against the homeowners.39 The court
reasoned that the jury may not have believed the defendants’ story detailing why
the use of force was necessary, and that giving a self-defense instruction would not
have changed the jury’s opinion regarding the facts at the center of the case.40
Even after Benson, however, the questions still remained: (1) what factors make
one’s presence “unlawful”; and (2) when is one required to vacate another’s home
or land upon request? The closest the court has come to answering these questions
was in State v. Neild, where the court examined a situation in which an individual
was given permission to be in a home, and found that he was “licensed and
privileged” to be on the property, and thus was there lawfully.41 The court noted
that the key requirement for a lawful presence is that the homeowner consents to
the defendant’s presence in the home.42
The Thurston case involved all of the above-mentioned issues, but raised yet
another issue, which is not well outlined by the court’s history: if the defendant
does not have explicit permission to be in the home, and he does not himself own
the home, but rather is the current or former intimate partner of the homeowner,
how does the court determine if he is in fact licensed and privileged to be in the
home? This issue was central to the court’s determination of whether Thurston had
presented evidence sufficient to warrant a self-defense instruction.
III. THE THURSTON DECISION
The altercation at the center of this case occurred on September 27, 2007, at
Suzanne Harmon’s home in Sullivan, Maine.43 Suzanne resides permanently at the
residence with her three children, one of which was fathered by the defendant,
Darrell Thurston.44 According to both Harmon and Thurston, they had resided
together in the past, had reunited, and had been living together for approximately

37. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 19, 724 A.2d 1222, 1230.
38. 155 Me. 115, 120 A.2d at 266, 269 (1959).
39. Id. at 121, 120 A.2d at 269.
40. Id. at 123, 120 A.2d at 271.
41. 2006 ME 91, ¶11, 903 A.2d 339, 341.
42. Id. The court did not, however, give any further definition of the meaning of “licensed and
privileged.”
43. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 2, 969 A.2d at 908.
44. Brief of Appellee State of Maine at 1, State v. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, 969 A.2d 906 (No. HAN08-205).
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one month on an intermittent basis.45 On the night in question, Thurston called
Harmon while on his way home from work to say he was coming over, and
Harmon told him not to come.46 Regardless, Thurston came to the house and
admitted that when he arrived he was told “he was not welcome there.”47 This is
where the parties’ versions of the events begin to differ, but they do agree that an
altercation took place. Harmon said that Thurston threw her on the ground and then
kicked and hit her in the head.48 She said that Thurston threw the meatballs she
was cooking into the trash, took her phone and smashed it, and then grabbed a
knife.49 Harmon says that she then picked up a knife in defense but put it down
when her child requested that she do so.50 Harmon also says that when she tried to
run outside, Thurston shoved her to the ground.51 According to Thurston’s
testimony, after they began arguing, he smashed Harmon’s cell phone and then
threw the meatballs in the trash.52 Thurston said that was when Harmon grabbed a
knife, and he had to grab her by the shoulders to stop her—and that was the only
time he used any force against her.53
Thurston was charged in Hancock County Superior Court with assault,
criminal mischief, and obstructing report of crime or injury.54 A jury found
Thurston guilty of assault and criminal mischief but not guilty of obstructing report
of crime or injury.55 On appeal, Thurston argued that there was sufficient evidence
presented to generate an instruction as to self-defense, and the Superior Court
justice erred in refusing to give such an instruction.56 Previously, the Superior
Court justice rejected the request for a self-defense instruction because he
concluded that the evidence, as presented, did not provide any basis upon which a
jury could find that it was necessary for the defendant to take the actions that he
did.57
On appeal to the Law Court, Thurston argued three main points: (1) there was
no physical evidence supporting the alleged victim’s version of the events; (2) his
testimony clearly stated that the only time he touched the alleged victim was when
45. Id. Harmon said they had been in a relationship for approximately five years, and Thurston
sometimes stayed at her residence, and sometimes he did not. Id. Thurston admitted that he and
Harmon had a “tumultuous” history, and said that on September 27, they “were again residing together.”
Brief of Appellant Darrell Thurston at 3, State v. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, 969 A.2d 906 (No. HAN-08205). He admitted that he had “hooked up” and stayed with a woman named Carly in the months
immediately prior to the incident. Id. See also Eric Russell, Grand Jury Indicts Suspect in Bar Harbor
Rape, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Dec. 5, 2007, at B2 (listing the local indictments: “Darrell J. Thurston, 37,
Seal Cove, assault, criminal mischief, obstructing the report of a crime.” It is important to note that
Thurston listed his residence as Seal Cove rather than Sullivan.).
46. Brief of Appellee, supra note 44, at 1 (Thurston makes no mention of this phone call.).
47. Brief of Appellant, supra note 45, at 3.
48. Brief of Appellee, supra note 44, at 1.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1-2.
51. Id.
52. Brief of Appellant, supra note 45, at 3.
53. Id.
54. Brief of Appellee, supra note 44, at 2.
55. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶¶ 1-2, 969 A.2d at 907-08.
56. Id. ¶ 7, 969 A.2d at 909.
57. Brief of Appellant, supra note 45, at 10.
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she went for the knife; and (3) the jury was free to consider both versions of the
events, and, if they accepted Thurston’s version, they should have been allowed to
consider that he acted in self-defense.58 Relying on State v. Bard,59 Thurston
further argued that because the complaint did not specify the exact act that
constituted the assault, the jury was free to interpret from all of the evidence to
which act the assault charge referred.60 The prosecution never raised the issue of
whether Thurston was lawfully in the home, so Thurston did not address it in his
appeal.
The prosecution argued that the court did not err by declining to give the selfdefense instruction61 because Thurston did not admit to the use of force during the
assault where he allegedly pushed Harmon in the home or the assault where he
pushed her down in the driveway.62 The State argued that, unlike Bard, a selfdefense instruction was not warranted because Thurston did not “present evidence
of self-defense with respect to any of the conduct testified to by the state’s
witnesses.”63 The State argued that in order to get the self-defense instruction,
Thurston needed to present evidence of self-defense that directly rebutted the
evidence of assault provided by the State’s witnesses.64
The majority opinion in Thurston first explained that in analyzing whether a
self-defense instruction was warranted, it needed to view the evidence in the “light
most favorable to the defendant.”65 Furthermore, the court stated that if the
evidence presented was sufficient to issue a self-defense instruction and the court
failed to give the instruction, Thurston would have been deprived of a fair trial, and
the omission would amount to obvious error.66 The court directly analogized to
Bard, and reasoned that the facts of this case very closely mirrored the facts of that
case, wherein an assault conviction was vacated due to the failure to provide an
instruction as to self-defense.67 Based on the facts as alleged by Thurston, the court
held that the jury could reasonably base their guilty assault verdict on his evidence,
and therefore a self-defense instruction was ultimately necessary.68
Justice Alexander’s dissent focused on an area of the law that neither the State
nor Thurston addressed in their individual briefs. The dissenting opinion looked
closely at the circumstances surrounding Thurston’s status as either a guest or
occupant of Harmon’s home.69 The dissent concluded that Thurston’s own version
of the events indicated that Thurston had no “right” to be in Harmon’s home once
58. Id. at 11.
59. State v. Bard, 2002 ME 49, ¶ 13, 793 A.2d 509, 513 (vacating an assault charge). Although the
jury found Bard guilty of assault, it also acquitted him of other charges, and as such, there was no way
to identify if the jury based its assault verdict on the evidence presented by Bard which warranted a selfdefense instruction.
60. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 7, 969 A.2d at 909.
61. Brief of Appellee, supra note 44, at 5.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 6.
64. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 8, 969 A.2d at 909.
65. Id. ¶ 9, 969 A.2d at 909 (quoting Glassman, 2001 ME 91, ¶ 12, 772 A.2d at 866).
66. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 9, 969 A.2d at 909.
67. Id. ¶ 11, 969 A.2d at 910.
68. Id. ¶ 12, 969 A.2d at 910.
69. Id. ¶ 19, 969 A.2d at 911 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
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she told him to leave, and that just because he had stayed overnight on previous
occasions, that did not give him the right to remain in the home.70 Once he was
requested by Harmon to leave the home, and he failed to do so, Harmon gained the
right to lawfully eject Thurston by threatening to use a knife, as he was then
rendered a trespasser.71 Because Thurston was trespassing, Harmon’s alleged use
of the knife would have been entirely lawful, and would not entitle Thurston to use
force. Therefore, a self-defense instruction was not available to him.72 The dissent
also attacked the majority’s interpretation of Bard, and differentiated between the
invitation into the victim’s home in that case and the demands of the victim in
Thurston for the defendant to not come to the home, and, once he was there, to
leave.73
In its opinion, the majority directly responded to the reasoning of the dissent
on the issue of trespass. The majority opinion acknowledged that whether a selfdefense instruction was generated “hinged” upon Thurston’s right to be in the
home.74 The majority interpreted the testimony of Harmon and Thurston in a
completely different manner than the dissent. The majority interpreted the facts in
their totality—Thurston and Harmon had been in an “on again off again”
relationship for five years, they had a daughter together, and they had been living
together for over a month—as proving that Thurston had a license to be in the
home because he lived with Harmon at the time of the incident.75 Therefore,
according to the majority, Thurston’s assertion that he acted in self-defense
mandated a jury instruction.76 Based on the finding that the failure to give a selfdefense instruction was obvious error, the court vacated the assault conviction
against Thurston, but affirmed his conviction for criminal mischief.77
IV. ANALYSIS
The Thurston decision, at first glance, appears to show a rift in the legal
analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions. The majority ultimately held that
a self-defense instruction was warranted, whereas the dissent reasoned that the facts
did not provide for a self-defense jury instruction, and Thurston’s conviction
should be upheld.
The Thurston decision represents the common situation in which the testimony
of the victim and defendant are ultimately at odds, and the court must make a
judgment call as to the sufficiency of the evidence. The difference in the Thurston
case, however, is that this factual evaluation ultimately hinged on a legal concept
70. Id. See State v. Benson, 155 Me. 115, 119, 151 A.2d 266, 268 (holding that intruders could not
receive a self-defense instruction because “[o]ne who has the opportunity to withdraw and fails to avail
himself of it is thereafter unlawfully where he has no business to be, and therefore cannot claim self
defense”).
71. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 21, 969 A.2d at 912.
72. Id. ¶ 23, 969 A.2d at 912.
73. Id. at ¶ 22.
74. Id. ¶ 13, 969 A.2d at 910.
75. Id. at ¶ 15.
76. Id.
77. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 16, 969 A.2d at 911 (regarding the charge of criminal mischief, the
court failed to provide any written opinion to show its reasoning for affirming the conviction).
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that is far from settled in Maine. While both the majority and dissent considered
the availability of self-defense in relation to trespass, and most importantly,
whether Thurston was licensed and privileged to be on the property, neither the
majority nor the dissent provided legal reasoning for why they decided Thurston
was or was not licensed and privileged. Rather, the court only provided their
respective personal opinions as to whether the facts, taken as a whole, represented a
license or privilege on the part of Thurston to be in Harmon’s home.
The language of 17-A M.R.S.A. section 104 makes it very clear that an
individual may use non-deadly force to prevent or terminate a criminal trespass.78
The baseline issue in Thurston, which the court noted must be determined before
getting to whether a self-defense instruction was generated, was whether Thurston
was trespassing when he was at Harmon’s home on the night of the incident.79 To
answer this question, both the majority and dissent took a detailed look at the facts
that they believed constituted Thurston’s privilege or lack thereof to be in the
home.
Justice Gorman’s majority opinion first looked at the fact that both Thurston
and Harmon said they had been involved in an “on again off again” relationship for
about five years and had been living together again for about one month before the
incident.80 Justice Gorman further reasoned that when determining whether a selfdefense instruction is generated, the court must “consider the record in the light
most favorable to Thurston.”81 Without any further explanation, the majority
concluded that based on these facts alone, the record “more than supports” the
conclusion that Thurston lived with Harmon at the time of the incident and was
therefore licensed and privileged to be in the home.82 The majority went so far as
to say that even Harmon’s statements telling Thurston not to come home were not
enough to eliminate his privilege to enter her home.83
In direct contrast, the dissent looked at the same set of facts, and came to the
opposite conclusion. In his dissent, Justice Alexander looked at the testimony
regarding Thurston’s habit of staying with Harmon and concluded that just because
Harmon “had permitted Thurston to spend the night on past occasions . . . that does
not diminish her authority to order him not to enter, to order him to leave when he
arrived, and to use force to attempt to eject him from her home . . . .”84 The
dissent’s interpretation of the facts placed Thurston in the role of trespasser, and
therefore, eliminated the availability of his self-defense request.
It is interesting to consider the possible unstated rationale for the majority and
dissent’s divergence regarding Thurston’s status as a trespasser. This case involves
two individuals who at some point in time were in an intimate relationship. The
altercation that took place between them was domestic in nature. Judging from the
opinions, it appears as though the dissent may have believed that there were issues
78. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 104(1) (2006 & Supp. 2008-2009).
79. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 13, 969 A.2d at 910 (“Whether a self-defense instruction was
generated, therefore, hinges on whether Thurston had a right to be in the home.”).
80. Id. ¶ 14, 969 A.2d at 910.
81. Id.
82. Id. ¶ 15, 969 A.2d at 910.
83. Id., 969 A.2d at 911.
84. Id. ¶ 20, 969 A.2d at 911.

2010]

STATE V. THURSTON

727

of domestic abuse in the relationship between Thurston and Harmon, and thus
factored that possibility into their opinion. The dissent’s opinion provides a more
generous respect for Harmon’s personal property rights than the opinion of the
majority. While the dissent clearly could not take prior acts of abuse or other facts
outside of the record into consideration, if there actually was any abuse, the
dissent’s analysis and opinion was the most effective means of dealing with it.
While factual and evidentiary interpretations are an important part of the
court’s role, the Thurston decision highlights an area in which the court could
seemingly benefit from the establishment of some objective, rather than purely
subjective, set of rules. As it currently stands, there is no objective means through
which the court determines at what point an individual in an intimate relationship
becomes licensed and privileged to be in their partner’s dwelling. In traditional
cases of trespass, whereby a stranger enters another’s land or home, it is easy to
draw the line at what constitutes trespass. Intimate partnerships, however, present
a more challenging analysis for the court. There are many different ways in which
people describe the relationships that they have with others. How is the court to
decide whether someone who sleeps at a partner’s home twice a week is licensed to
be in the home? What if someone maintains all of their possessions at a partner’s
home, but rarely sleeps there? While clearly some circumstances will warrant a
more subjective view due to special circumstances, a more objective standard
would benefit both the court and the public, by providing some notice of the rules
the court will follow.
Maine’s case law on “license and privilege” in domestic situations is quite
limited. The decision in State v. Neild,85 although not exactly on point for guidance
in Thurston, does provide some important judicial reasoning from which the court
could build. In Neild, the defendant was deemed to be licensed and privileged to
be in his girlfriend’s home because she had invited him there.86 Therefore, when
the girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend showed up, and the defendant got in an altercation
with him, the defendant’s use of force was held to be lawful.87 Furthermore,
because the girlfriend told her ex-boyfriend to leave, his presence in the home was
unlawful, and any actions the defendant took against him were lawful.88 In Neild,
the expression of permission from a homeowner to an intimate partner was held to
be determinative of a license to be in the home. However, this still fails to provide
guidance as to when one is licensed to be in another’s home absent express
permission to be there.
Looking to other states, it is apparent that much of the case law regarding
license and privilege in domestic relationships relates specifically to spousal
relationships.89 In an effort to provide a bright line rule about when individuals are
85. 2006 ME 91, 903 A.2d 339.
86. Id. ¶ 11, 903 A.2d at 341.
87. Id. ¶ 14, 903 A.2d at 342.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Iowa v. Hagedorn, 679 N.W.2d 666 (Iowa 2004) (holding that defendant had no right,
license, or privilege to enter martial home of estranged wife when he moved out one month prior and
was told not to enter the home); People v. Davenport, 219 Cal. App.3d 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that husband’s right to enter marital home ended after he had moved out of the home five
months prior). See also John M. Leventhal, Spousal Rights or Spousal Crime: Where and When Are the
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licensed and privileged after entering a partner’s home, it is also useful to look at
how other states define “cohabitation.”90 The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v.
Williams, set forth a useful example of the type of rule that the court could establish
and utilize in the future.91 The court stated that the essential elements of
cohabitation are “(1) sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and (2)
consortium.”92 The decision laid out specific factors that the court can use as
guideposts in determining whether two individuals are in effect cohabitating.93 The
Williams court stated that sharing familial or financial responsibility could include
“provisions for shelter, food, clothing, utilities, and/or commingled assets.”94 The
court expanded consortium to include “mutual respect, fidelity, affection, society,
cooperation, solace, comfort, aid of each other, friendship, and conjugal
relations.”95 In establishing the rule, the Ohio court stressed that although they
were setting forth specific factors to aid in determining cohabitation status, the
“factors are unique to each case and how much weight, if any, to give to each of
these factors must be decided on a case-by-case basis . . . .”96
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Thurston could have benefited
from employing the type of detailed analysis that was undertaken in Williams. The
Thurston case provided the court with a prime opportunity to outline the specific
factors present in the relationship between Thurston and Harmon, which they saw
as either supporting or disproving Thurston’s actions as trespass. For example,
instead of merely stating that there was no trespass because Thurston had lived in
Harmon’s home for over one month, the majority could have detailed the specific
live-in time period they saw as a cutoff, or elaborated on other factors they may
have considered in their decision (sharing expenses, meals, or parenting
responsibilities). By providing more detailed criteria, the court could have set a
more clear precedent, and perhaps more importantly, sounded a warning signal to
individuals inviting their partners into their home—after “x” number of days living
together, you may be giving your partner an unlimited license to be in your home.
The Thurston opinion, while clearly based on the legal issue of self-defense
instructions, also has important policy considerations that bear mentioning. In the
Thurston case, it was undisputed that the individuals were in some form of a
domestic relationship. In evaluating this relationship, and determining whether
individuals such as Thurston and Harmon are in effect cohabitating, and whether
Thurston was licensed and privileged, it is important for judges to be able to step
back from the situation, and at the very least recognize the possible presence of
Lines To Be Drawn?, UTAH L. REV. 351 (2006) (outlining the historical changes many crimes involving
spouses have undergone).
90. See, e.g., Ohio v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126 (Ohio 1997) (holding that where the parties did
not live together on a regular basis, but the parties often stayed together more nights out of the week
than apart, they were cohabitating); Hawaii v. Archuletta, 946 P.2d 620 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that victim’s testimony that defendant lived at her residence three to four times a week was proof that
they were jointly residing together).
91. Williams, 683 N.E. 2d at 1130.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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domestic violence. In cases such as Thurston, where judges are utilizing their own
life experiences and opinions in determining whether two individuals were living
together at the time a violent assault took place, it is imperative that the judges are
equipped with adequate knowledge to guide them through the determinative
process.97
The implications of the Thurston decision are possibly quite serious. The
Thurston decision begs the question—when exactly can a partner say “no”? While
the Thurston decision never explicitly mentions domestic violence, it is clear that
the violent altercation between Thurston and Harmon was domestic, and it likely
was not the first time that an incident of that nature had occurred. Domestic
violence is often hard to recognize.98 Furthermore, current evidentiary models and
criminal statutes are often inadequate in their ability to highlight and explain the
full realm of domestic violence.99 It is for these very reasons that the open-ended
conclusion in the majority opinion is especially dangerous. For those individuals
dealing with issues of domestic violence, it is a scary prospect to think that based
on Thurston, their intimate partner will likely be afforded an unlimited license to be
in their homes after living there “on an intermittent” basis for only one month, or
possibly less.
V. CONCLUSION
Thurston in part represents a traditional factual conundrum—which witness to
believe? The clashing opinions of the majority and dissent represent the failure of
the court to agree upon a factual interpretation of the testimony. Based upon a
broad interpretation of the facts of this case, the dissenting opinion more
adequately considers the risks inherent in providing a self-defense instruction to a
man who was a guest in his girlfriend’s home. The majority opinion provides an
analysis of trespass, which while legally sound based on precedent, presents a
dangerous rule for individuals involved in domestic relationships. Based on the
court’s holding, the majority opens the door for individuals to claim privilege upon
living in a partner’s home for a very short period of time. Even more troubling, the
court decided that a homeowner’s demand for non-entry is not sufficient to prevent
trespass when the “trespasser” has lived in the home for virtually any period of
time.
The dissent, like the majority, took a subjective look at the facts, and decided
that Thurston’s occasional overnight stays at Harmon’s home were not enough to
strip her of her right to keep him out of her home or to remove him. Maine case
law only partially dictated the outcome of the trespass portion of this case—it was
97. See Jacqueline St. Joan, Sex, Sense, and Sensibility: Trespassing into the Culture of Domestic
Abuse, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 263 (1997) (arguing that judges would benefit greatly from expanded
training, including exposure to outside literature, in order to improve their background knowledge of
domestic violence).
98. Mary Ann Dutton & Catherine L. Waltz, Domestic Violence: Understanding Why It Happens
and How To Recognize It, FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1995, 14, 14 (“Even when there is evidence of injury
or threats of severe violence, the complex dynamics of domestic violence and the secrecy and distortions
that shroud it can lead professionals to minimize or fail to recognize it altogether.”).
99. Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative
Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 566 (2007).
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primarily based on subjective judicial interpretation. It appears, however, that in a
situation where the Maine case law was unsettled, the dissent took the more
cautious approach, and, in the process, protected a single mother’s right to safety in
her own home.

